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An Ever Closer Union: The European 
Security and Defense Policy and 
the Development of Hard Power 
Capabilities in the European Union
Daniel Stepanicich
INTRODUCTION
The European Union represents one of the most successful geopolitical projects of the 
twentieth century, and in the last ten years it has been undergoing a revolution. Since the 
Single European Act in 1986 tore down prohibitive trade barriers, the European Union has 
emerged as the world’s leading economy with a gross-domestic product of over sixteen bil-
lion dollars (International Monetary Fund, 2011). The European Union (EU) is an econom-
ic giant on the world stage, but it has usually lacked political clout beyond trade negotiations. 
The post-Cold War global environment offered the EU a chance to expand its influence. 
With the advent of the European Security and Defense Policy (now the Common Security 
and Defense Policy) in 1999 the EU can no longer be considered only a civilian economic 
power. The EU will certainly not turn into a global superpower – it voluntarily shuns that 
possibility despite the claims of some fervent European autonomists – but it is taking a more 
active role in the world. The EU of the twenty-first century is outfitted with several new 
foreign policy tools, especially in crisis-management, that will allow it to act beyond Europe.
I will examine the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in an attempt to 
determine the extent of security and defense integration in Europe. ESDP is a broad policy 
that covers a range of activities from military operations to civilian crisis-management mis-
sions. The military capabilities of ESDP have been far more controversial than the civilian re-
sponsibilities since they touch upon the core areas of national sovereignty. While the civilian 
aspect of ESDP is interesting, I will focus on the military dimension. I attempt to answer two 
fundamental questions. First, why has European security and defense integration progressed 
since the 1990s? Second, what are the barriers to further integration that have caused ESDP 
to take its current limited form? In answering these questions, I attempt to embed the em-
pirical data within a theoretical framework. If full integration is a standing European army 
with the national governments able to act with one voice then the EU has a long way to go, 
but its current progress is impressive considering the long and torturous history of European 
security and defense policy.
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Structure of the Paper
Many previous studies on ESDP focused on either on policy initiation or policy out-
comes to pass judgments on the prospects of defense integration. The EU has conducted 
twenty-four operations of which eight have been military operations. Defining operational 
success is difficult, and the failure of an operation to meet its mission goals is not necessar-
ily due to a problem in the integration process. Instead, I look at the process of integration 
across key requirements for a common security and defense policy: common procurement, 
intelligence cooperation, interoperability, and operational planning capabilities. In the fol-
lowing sections, I will first provide a theoretical overview of European security and defense 
integration. Then I will closely examine the institutional development behind each selected 
indicator. I will conclude with a discussion on the impacts of the Lisbon Treaty on European 
security and defense integration and policy implications. 
CONTENDING THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
There have been few substantive attempts to theorize on European security and de-
fense integration despite the rich theoretical work on European economic integration. Until 
the 1990s there was little reason to theorize on European security integration since there 
was very little action on the European level. The development of the European Security and 
Defense Policy presented difficulties to scholars since it was such a politicized issue with 
American observers denouncing it as power-balancing and Europeans calling it a key com-
ponent of the European project. A theoretical void appeared since none of the traditional 
integration theories dealt with security and defense issues.
Most recent scholars and analysts attempted to explain ESDP through the intergov-
ernmentalist literature. Stanley Hoffman (1966) provided the first important contribution 
to intergovernmentalism when he argued that integration will always be limited due to 
heterogeneous national preferences among the nation-states of Europe. In The Choice for 
Europe Andrew Moravcsik (1998) added another key contribution to the intergovernmental-
ist school. He argued that integration could be explained by the convergence of economic 
interests among the important European powers notably the United Kingdom, France, and 
Germany. Skeptics of European defense integration quickly saw value in the intergovern-
mentalist framework. ESDP is under the purview of the Council of the European Union 
(Council), the intergovernmental legislative body of the EU. All decisions on European 
defense policy are made through the intergovernmental bargaining process. The theory also 
easily explained the lack of integration by placing the blame on the lack of Member State 
preference convergence. The problem with intergovernmentalism was that while it nicely 
explained treaty negotiations and Council meetings, it completely ignored the ability of EU 
actors and institutions to influence the positions of the Member States.
Prior to the intergovernmentalists, the supranationalists argued that elite actors on the 
supranational level were the drivers of integration. In The Uniting of Europe, Ernst Haas 
(1958) laid the foundation of European integration theory with his explanation of neo-
functionalism. He argued that integration was a process where political actors shifted their 
loyalty from the national level to the supranational level creating a new state. This integration 
occurred through a process called “spill-over,” where integration in one sector led to further 
integration in another sector (Haas, 1958, p.293). Neo-functionalism incorrectly assumed 
that the integration process (spill-over) was self-deterministic leading automatically to full 
political integration. More importantly, it too quickly discounted the role of the nation-state 
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in the integration process. 
Both intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism ignore the role of the United States 
on European integration. As both theories are primarily concerned with economic integra-
tion this is forgivable, but the United States cannot be ignored in a discussion on European 
defense integration. There is no grand theory on the relationship between the United States 
and Europe over integration but realism and neo-realism attempt to understand the trans-
atlantic relationship. The neo-realists propose that Europe is power-balancing against the 
United States but the development of ESDP does not fit such an explanation. In the realist 
school, Hegemonic Stability Theory provides a useful explanation suggesting that a hege-
mon provides security and stability, causing junior partners to free-ride and neglect their 
own responsibilities (Snidal, 1985). The presence of the United States hinders integration 
since there is little reason for Europe to devote its own scarce resources to develop institu-
tional capabilities as long as NATO provides those services for minimal cost. While Hege-
monic Stability Theory is useful in explaining the dynamic of the transatlantic relationship, 
it does not directly address European integration and must be used in conjunction with the 
traditional theories of integration.
A Hybrid Model of European Security and Defense Integration
Since intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism ignore key parts of the integration 
process, I propose a model that incorporates both theories and situates them within the 
larger transatlantic security framework as defined by the realist literature. The intergovern-
mentalist framework works best when analyzing the role of national governments, while 
neo-functionalism is useful in examining the actions and development of EU institutions in 
Brussels. Furthermore, I add a third dimension to account for the United States. My find-
ings suggest that a three part model best explains the development of European security and 
defense integration.
A recent body of literature, known as “Brusselization” or “supranational intergovern-
mentalism,” is helpful in synthesizing the two traditional integration theory schools. “Brus-
selization” theory is not new to the debate on European integration and has previously been 
used to explain other policy areas of the EU. However, it has only recently been applied to 
ESDP. Brusselization theory argues that national representatives socialize together in Brussels 
and in the process establish an esprit de corps within the EU institutions such as COREPER, 
the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, or the EU Military Staff. 
The national representatives work to find common solutions through frequent and intense 
meetings. Also they are often posted in Brussels for several years developing close working 
relationships with their counterparts (Lewis, 2005). Unlike Haas’s (1958) neofunctionalist 
theory, the representatives do not transfer their loyalty from their national governments to 
the EU. Instead the representatives believe they have a dual loyalty. Their role is to accurately 
represent their Member States, but they also have a responsibility to reach a collective agree-
ment (Lewis, 2005). Insulation is one last important aspect of Brusselization. The national 
representatives are insulated from their domestic constituent pressures giving them some de 
facto decision-making capabilities independent of the national capitals (Lewis, 2005). Once 
the compromises are reached, the representatives return to their national governments to 
persuade them to accept the agreements (Cross, 2010). Brusselization provides the link be-
tween the intergovernmentalist and supranationalist literature since it accounts for the role of 
EU institutions without disregarding the intergovernmental negotiation process. 
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The United States/NATO framework is the first level of analysis. Over the last sixty 
years the United States via NATO has shaped the security and defense structure of Europe. 
In the process it has created certain lines that cannot be crossed. Some of these boundar-
ies are intentionally created such as placing territorial defense solely under the purview of 
NATO. Attempts to expand ESDP into territorial defense were stiffly rebuked by Wash-
ington and never made it far in discussions. Other boundaries are unintentional and are 
the result of free-riding and bandwagoning by the European Member States. As the first 
security institution, NATO is able to shape the development of ESDP. The NATO security 
framework has its biggest impact on the development of national government preferences. In 
discussions on ESDP, national governments balance the benefits of an autonomous European 
security policy with the benefits and immense resources provided by the NATO alliance.
Next, the Member States negotiate with each other based on their national preferences. 
For the most part the European institutions cannot expand their authority or create new 
bodies without the approval of the individual Member States. Momentum for European 
security and defense integration in the last ten years has been driven by France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom (UK). In particular, significant developments in defense integra-
tion have occurred between France and the UK with Germany acting as a pivot. The result 
has been the creation of European institutions through the intergovernmental process that 
mirror the preferences of the Member States especially Germany’s preference for an autono-
mous, civilian centered crisis-management capability (Miskimmon & Paterson, 2006).
Once institutions develop at the European level they begin to develop their own mo-
mentum and sustainability as according to Brusselization theory (Breuer, 2010). The policy-
makers responsible for the day-to-day activity of ESDP spend most of their time in Brus-
sels providing them some degree of autonomy from their national capitals. Over time they 
develop a “team spirit” and institutional identity that aims to reach compromises and ensure 
the success of ESDP. The policy outcomes developed by the EU institutions do not run 
counter to national preferences since the national governments still maintain a veto in the 
process, but the national governments are not able to micromanage the EU institutions. As a 
result the EU institutions are able to push back against the national governments and influ-
ence their preference formation through the supranational process. In sum, integration is the 
process where national governments facing internal and external demands cede authority to 
a supranational body which then overtime is able to influence the behavior and actions of 
the national governments.
Only a model that accounts for the United States, EU institutions, and European na-
tional governments can properly explain European security and defense integration. Euro-
pean defense integration moved forward in the late 1990s because changes in the transatlan-
tic security environment gave a window for a European policy. In 1999 the preferences of 
France, Germany, and the UK moved close enough to allow for collaboration on European 
defense capabilities. However, defense integration has only slowly developed because of the 
continued presence of the United States, reluctance of national governments to give up 
sovereignty, and under-resourced EU institutions. This comprehensive model is useful in 
examining the four indicators.
COMMON DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
Joint weapons procurement has been a prominent feature of the European defense in-
dustry over the last sixty years. The individual European states lack the defense budgets and 
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domestic markets to independently procure advance military technology. Furthermore, the 
United States defense market places pressures on the European market to restructure and en-
ticed European contractors to divert attention away from Europe. Multinational collabora-
tion is a natural outcome of European defense market restructuring. Common defense pro-
curement is important for European security and defense integration because it shows a shift 
away from national to European priorities. It encourages a convergence of thinking about 
international security among European governments leading to the possible formation of a 
European security identity (Keohane, 2002). From a practical standpoint, any European in-
tervention force requires advanced equipment that no one Member State can fully provide.
Joint Procurement from the WEU to ESDP
In order to encourage and support joint procurement projects the Europeans initiated 
several institutions to facilitate armaments procurement. The 1948 Brussels Treaty included 
provisions to standardize weaponry, eventually forming the Western European Armaments 
Group (WEAG), but little effort was taken to rationalize procurement (Rees, 1999). In 
1976 the United States pressured the Europeans to create the Independent European Pro-
gram Group (IEPG) to coordinate European defense-industrial policies. The Europeans also 
hoped to use the IEPG to gain leverage in opening up the United States defense market to 
European firms (Lovering, 1999). In 1992, the IEPG was incorporated into WEAG. Yet, none 
of these institutions had any real power. The WEAG could only provide political coordina-
tion and discuss armaments standards; it could not force members to act or manage projects 
(Keohane, 2002). It was an organization with a lot of talking but little action or influence 
over the European defense industry.
In the 1980s, France and Germany began discussing a more ambitious alternative to 
the WEAG. Their goal was to create a European Armaments Agency, but during the 1980s 
nothing was established due to resistance from the national armed forces and a fear that the 
United States would benefit more from European cooperation (Lovering, 1999). The UK 
opposed efforts to establish an institution to manage procurement projects until it realized 
that its position put its firms at a disadvantage in continental Europe (Lovering, 1999). With 
no further British opposition, France and Germany along with the UK and Italy established 
the Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) in 1996. It became a legal 
entity in 2001 and now includes six members with the entry of Belgium and Spain. OC-
CAR’s key task was to establish clearly defined sets of procedures for managing joint pro-
curement programs (Keohane, 2002). Unlike the WEAG, OCCAR played an active role in 
managing programs although it could not force a country to procure a weapons platform. 
The case of the A400M transport, the first project undertaken by OCCAR, shows that the 
organization has not completely solved the problems that plague joint procurement projects. 
By 2011, the A400M was about five million euros over budget and several years behind 
schedule (Kissler & Pearson, 2011). The failings of the A400M have tarnished OCCAR 
although it continues to be an active institution.
The institutions of the WEU collapsed into ESDP after the St. Malo summit. In 2003, 
France and the UK agreed to the formation of a new EU defense procurement agency. 
The European Defense Agency (EDA), launched in 2004, had three main tasks: harmoniz-
ing military requirements, coordinating defense R&D, and encouraging the convergence of 
national procurement procedures (Grevi & Keohane, 20094). The participants thought the 
EDA would have more influence than the WEAG since it would carry the political clout of 
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the EU (Grevi & Keohane, 2009). Like its predecessors the EDA could only help coordinate 
Member States, and it did not have any power to “force Member States to spend more on 
equipment or buy particular types of equipment” (Grevi & Keohane, 2009, p.85). In 2006, 
the EDA introduced a defense procurement “Code of Conduct.” Countries that joined the 
Code of Conduct vowed to open non-essential defense contracts worth over a million euros 
to foreign bidders, and to aid the process the EDA set up a website to post those contracts 
(Keohane, 2008). While the code showed that in principle the national governments agreed 
that European defense markets need to be more open, in practice only very few of the vol-
untarily posted contracts were awarded to foreign bidders (Keohane, 2008). The added value 
of the EDA was that it provided information that previously was not readily available. The 
EDA maintained an immense amount of data on the European defense industry and national 
policies. It also drafted various reports to indentify vital gaps in European defense capabili-
ties and provide a long-term vision (Grevi & Keohane, 2009). The EDA still faced the same 
problems as the previous intergovernmental organizations, but it was more than a forum 
for political discussion since it provided much more information to the Member States and 
defense firms than the WEAG or the IPEG.
The Commission and a Common Defense Market
Until recently the Commission was unable to expand the common market to the 
defense sector. The 1957 Rome Treaty that formed the European Community excluded de-
fense issues from a common market under Article 296. The article provided two exceptions 
to the common market:
“(a) No Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of 
which it considers contrary to the essential interests of its security;
(b) any Member State may take such measures as it considers necessary for the 
protection of the essential interests of its security which are connected with the 
production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material…” (Aalto, 2008, p.17).
The Commission repeatedly tried to expand its jurisdiction into defense but the Mem-
ber States strongly resisted by keeping Article 296 unchanged through the Maastricht, Am-
sterdam, Nice, and Lisbon treaties. An opening for the Commission emerged in the 1990s 
and 2000s. Following a European Court of Justice ruling, the Commission declared com-
petence over arms exports but the national governments largely ignored the Commission 
(Lovering, 1999). However, the Commission did win a concession over dual-use technolo-
gies. Then, in 2004 the Commission filed a report showing widespread misuse of Article 296 
especially in the interpretation of “essential interests of its security” (European Commission, 
2011). Member States were using Article 296 to cover all defense procurement since they felt 
that the Commission’s public procurement directive was unsuitable for defense. 
By the mid-2000s the Member States began to drop the opposition to the Commis-
sion playing a role in defense procurement due to their declining defense budgets and the 
new approach taken by the Commission (Keohane, 2008). Instead of changing Article 296 
the Commission developed a set of binding procurement rules designed for security and 
defense issues. Member States could only use Article 296 for the most sensitive projects, but 
they would have to provide reasoning (Keohane, 2008). The Council approved the directive 
in August 2009 giving Member States two years to transpose the directive into national law. 
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It remains unclear how exactly the new directive will change the European defense industry 
especially since the Member States have not finished transposing the directive into law; how-
ever, the Commission is setting the foundation for a common defense market.
INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION
Intelligence cooperation is a second key component of security and defense integra-
tion. It allows for common threat perception since everyone has access to the same informa-
tion, and on a practical level it ensures that forces operating under ESDP have the proper 
information to carry out their mission. Cooperation can take two forms. Horizontal coor-
dination involves the construction of a network that national intelligence agencies use to 
exchange intelligence information with each other (Muller-Wille, 2004). Vertical assistance 
occurs when a supranational body produces its own assessments from the intelligence col-
lected by national agencies or by the supranational body itself (Muller-Wille, 2004). The lat-
ter has been the most common method of cooperation undertaken by the EU due to several 
factors such as national sovereignty, trust, and privileged relationships.
Intelligence Difficulties: Trust and the United States
Distrust is an important factor hindering greater intelligence cooperation. In practice 
the problem of trust is visible in the relationship between the Big Three and the East Euro-
pean states admitted to the EU in 2004. It is widely assumed that the intelligence services 
of the former communist states are penetrated by the Russian Secret Service (Ruter, 2007). 
Many of these national agencies employ former agents of the KGB (Ruter, 2007). In 2008, 
a Russian spy with high level access to NATO’s classified information was uncovered in 
Estonia’s defense ministry furthering distrust between the West and East (Boyers, 2008). Also, 
Member States are afraid to disrupt privileged relationships with the United States. The 
strong link with the United States makes the UK hesitant to cooperate with its European 
partners or endorse a European intelligence project. The British do not want to open their 
intelligence network to all EU Member States for fear that the United States would stop 
sharing information. Likewise, the United States does not necessarily want everything it 
gives to the British to end up with other European nations (Ruter, 2007). Distrust between 
EU Member States is high, and the Member States place a high value on access to American 
intelligence information making cooperation difficult.
European Intelligence Institutions
The WEU was the first European institution to address intelligence cooperation. Prior 
to the WEU in the early 1970s the Europeans formed the informal Berne Group which was 
a forum for six European security services; now all twenty-seven EU members participate. 
It was the principle point of contact for the heads of the national intelligence agencies, but 
it lay outside of the EU and was mainly concerned with terrorism and organized crime 
(Aldrich, 2004). The WEU established the Torrejon Satellite Center in 1993. Despite its 
name, the Satellite Center did not own or operate any satellites (Nomikos, 2005). Instead, it 
purchased commercial images and analyzed them for the WEU or the WEU member states. 
Furthermore, it only had a staff of sixty-eight mainly tasked with processing the images 
(Muller-Wille, 2002). With the formation of ESDP, the Satellite Center was transferred to 
the EU where it fell under the indirect control of the Secretary-General/High Representa-
tive (SG/HR). While limited, the Satellite Center provided an intelligence processing capa-
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bility available to all WEU/EU members that was not previously available at the European 
level. 
To address intelligence cooperation under ESDP, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) has an 
intelligence division to promote information sharing. The division is tasked with situation 
assessment, early warning, and provides operational support during an EU military operation 
(Ruter, 2007). It receives its information from the Member States via a national liaison of-
ficer in the EUMS. In order to encourage Member States to contribute, the EUMS processes 
the information in such a way that a contributing nation cannot be identified (Muller-Wille, 
2002). In practice this system is hindered by the fact that there are only seven Member States 
with foreign intelligence services and each one has their own niche capabilities and coverage 
making identification relatively easy (Walsh, 2006). The intelligence division of the EUMS is 
limited by a small staff, but it does provide unique information that cannot be provided by 
the national agencies (Muller-Wille, 2004). Only the EUMS and a couple other institutions 
can create European intelligence assessments that can be used by the EU for its security policy. 
The Situation Center (SITCEN), established after the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 by 
High Representative Javier Solana, is a final important European intelligence institution. It is 
tasked with examining how international crises affect European interests and collecting in-
telligence in support of the decision-making, planning, and performance of ESDP missions 
(Ruter, 2007). Seven Member States (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
and the UK) each send one intelligence analyst and the EU institutions send an additional 
thirteen people. Not all EU members participate in the SITCEN since High Representative 
Solana wanted an effective and competent unit composed of members that could trust each 
other (Muller-Wille, 2008). As a result, the SITCEN is able to avoid the distrust problem 
that has plagued European intelligence cooperation. The SITCEN produces information 
that synthesizes the civilian and military aspects of conflict management and threat percep-
tion – a capability not provided by any national agencies (Ruter, 2007). Julia Ruter (2007) 
suggests that the SITCEN acts as a “socializer” where representatives from Member States 
work together to form reports for EU level decision making (p.34). Following the Brus-
selization model, the officials see themselves as negotiators working to find compromises at 
the European level rather than passive recipients of national instructions. In the process, they 
develop a “team spirit” that strives for success in order to make the institution (and in the 
process their work) look good (Ruter, 2007, p.35). The intelligence representatives to the 
SITCEN are not acting against the preferences of their home government, but they have 
enough independence allowing for the creation of a European product.
INTEROPERABILITY: JOINT TRAINING AND BATTLEGROUPS
Interoperability has been one of the least contentious aspects of European defense 
policy. Rarely do European states engage in large military operations outside the context of 
NATO, the UN, or other international organization. European militaries are used to work-
ing with each other and encourage bilateral or multilateral training arrangements. Such ar-
rangements improve interoperability and allow for the pooling of scarce resources. If current 
defense spending trends continue then one way for the European states to field advanced 
military assets is by pooling. In the 1990s several joint training and asset pooling organiza-
tions were initiated to address European capability shortfalls that individual states could not 
reach on their own; however, the institutionalization of these organizations did not rapidly 
proceed at the European level. 
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Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation Efforts
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Western European states established a variety of 
joint training and integrated military units. The Franco-German brigade established in 1987 
was one of the biggest accomplishments during the period of Franco-German cooperation. 
While the brigade was more symbolic than substantive, it did set the groundwork for future 
efforts. The Franco-German brigade was transformed into the Eurocorps after 1992 with the 
inclusion of Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The Eurocorps provides force headquarters 
capabilities to either NATO or the EU and can deploy up to 60,000 personnel drawn from 
the five framework nations (Laity, 1999). However, the Eurocorps mostly conducted opera-
tions under NATO rather than as part of ESDP. In 1994, France and the UK established the 
European Air Group (EAG) that now includes Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, and 
Germany. Its objective is “to improve the operational capabilities of the Parties Air Forces to 
carry out operations in pursuit of shared interests, primarily through mechanisms which en-
hance interoperability” (European Air Group, 2011). Unlike the Eurocorps, the EAG is not a 
standing force. To achieve its objective it engages in multinational training programs and co-
ordination of air assets to improve interoperability. Other bilateral and multilateral arrange-
ments outside the EU institutions include EUROFOR, EUROMARFOR, the European 
Gendarmerie Force, the Spanish-Italian amphibious force, the European Air Coordination 
cell, and the Athens Multinational Sealift Coordination Center. 
The EU Battlegroups
The formation of ESDP gave the EU the ability to better coordinate the various coop-
eration arrangements that emerged in the 1990s. At the EU Helsinki summit in 1999 follow-
ing the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, the EU governments agreed to the creation 
of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) consisting of 60,000 troops plus supporting 
assets (Grevi & Keohane, 2009). In 2004, the ERRF was transformed into the battlegroup 
concept. France, the UK, and Germany proposed that the EU should establish thirteen 
battlegroups plus niche capabilities each consisting of 1,500 troops and deployable within 
two weeks for rapid crisis management. The concept required that two battlegroups always 
remain on standby (Mardell, 2008). Full Operational Capability was reached in January 2007. 
The battlegroups were intended to bolster the European military capability for both ESDP 
and NATO operations and allow for rapid peacekeeping interventions. 
While the battlegroups are a significant step, they are limited and have faced difficulties. 
First, they do not actually represent any new forces as they consist of the former bilateral and 
multilateral initiatives. For example, in the second half of 2011 EUROFOR will provide one 
of the standby battlegroups (Eurofor, 2011). Second, the battlegroups do not represent any 
supranationalization of training. The EU has established broad guidelines for certifying the 
battlegroups, but the contributing states are responsible for certifying their own units (Lind-
strom, 2007). As a result, there is no provision in the training system for EU-led exercises 
(Lindstrom, 2007). However, outside battlegroup certification the EU does engage in several 
training exercises each year. Third, it is unlikely that the EU could actually deploy 60,000 
troops. Before the battlegroups became fully operational in 2007 the contributing states only 
volunteered “paper” armies. The contributing states found several ways to explain why the 
battlegroups could not be used to prevent their own forces from being deployed (Angelet & 
Vrailas, 2008). Finally, NATO has a similar rapid reaction force complicating the relationship 
between the EU and NATO. The two forces are designed to be complementary and rein-
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forcing but concerns over duplication remain (Lindstrom, 2007). Furthermore, the NATO 
rapid reaction force has additional capabilities making it more effective at a wider range of 
tasks (Lindstrom, 2007). The EU battlegroups do represent a military capability available to 
the EU, but their use has been largely underutilized.
OPERATIONAL PLANNING
Whereas opposition to procurement and intelligence cooperation diminished in the last 
two decades, operational planning has been the most contentious aspect of ESDP. It refers to 
the planning and strategy necessary to conduct missions abroad. An autonomous European 
operational planning capability came into direct conflict with NATO’s integrated military 
command. Past integration efforts such as the WEU were involved with procurement, intel-
ligence, or interoperability, but they completely lacked any autonomous planning capability. 
France wanted to use ESDP as the vehicle to finally provide the Europeans with their own 
operational headquarters (OHQ) capacity. The United States feared that such a step would 
decouple Europe from the United States security framework provided by NATO. An au-
tonomous European planning capability was vehemently pushed by France and Germany 
just as transatlantic relations began to fray over the invasion of Iraq. Over time the European 
developed three methods to handle operational planning: the Berlin-Plus agreements giving 
the EU access to NATO assets, national operational headquarters, and an EU planning cell.
NATO and Berlin-Plus
NATO’s operational headquarters (OHQ) is the first option available to the Europeans, 
and it can be the most effective depending on the situation. In the mid-1990s, the WEU at-
tempted to find a way to gain access to NATO assets. The resulting European Security and 
Defense Identity (ESDI) allowed for the WEU to borrow assets, especially planning capabili-
ties, from NATO and provided for the formation of a European identity separate from the 
United States within NATO (Howorth, 2007). ESDI failed in part because the United States 
was reluctant to lend its high-tech assets; however, the arrangement reemerged as Berlin-Plus 
in 2002 after six years of additional negotiations. The Berlin-Plus arrangement was first used 
in Macedonia during Operation Concordia (2003) where the EU was tasked with taking over 
for NATO forces. The mission was delayed several months due to Turkish opposition which 
became a recurrent problem when using Berlin-Plus (Gross, 2009). Disagreements between 
Cyprus (an EU member since 2004 but not a NATO Partnership-for-Peace member) and 
Turkey hindered cooperation between the two organizations (Keohane, 2009). Berlin-Plus is 
only problematic at the political stage, but “there is little doubt that, given NATO’s outstand-
ing planning and C2 [command and control] capability, the Berlin Plus track represents the 
Union’s best planning and C2 bet so far if the potential EUFOR lies within the handover 
framework – the EU taking over a NATO operation (Simon, 2010, p.39).” In cases where 
NATO is not engaged, the EU has a second mechanism for operational planning.
The Framework Nation Approach: National OHQs
National OHQs have been used for all EU military missions outside the Balkans 
but have faced several difficulties. The framework nation approach consists of five national 
OHQs in France, UK, Germany, Italy, and Greece augmented by multinational staff (Guille, 
2006). These are not permanent headquarters but they can be quickly set-up to handle 
ESDP operations. The central problem with the framework nation approach is that the 
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Member States do not always make their OHQs available for ESDP missions. For EUFOR 
RD Congo (2006) the French did not want to offer their OHQ since France had just con-
cluded leading the previous ESDP operation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(Simon, 2010). The British did not want to lead an operation due to their commitments 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Italians did not want to take up the issue during elections. 
Germany took up responsibility as a last resort, but it was unprepared due to its own com-
mitment in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo and the arrival of a new government in Berlin 
(Simon, 2010). In theory there should always be a national OHQ available since each EU 
battlegroup on standby has an associated OHQ, but in practice the availability of national 
headquarters has been intermittent.
The Civ/Mil Cell: a European Option
In the absence of national OHQs and access to NATO assets, the EU Member States 
agreed to establish a European capability called the Civ/Mil Cell. France had long been 
the main advocate of an autonomous strategic level of command, but the UK was hesitant 
to create any institutions that would duplicate resources already available through NATO 
(Simon, 2010). Germany shared a similar view to the UK which explains the difficulty in 
establishing a European OHQ. While the UK and Germany did not want to create any au-
tonomous capability for the EU, they did not oppose the creation of the Civ/Mil Cell. The 
UK saw the cell as a way to confine ESDP to civilian affairs (Simon, 2010). Germany saw 
the cell as a match to its own defense policy that stressed the link between the military and 
civilian aspects of conflict management. The compromise between the Big Three created the 
Civ/Mil Cell with the task to “reinforce the national HQ designated to conduct an EU au-
tonomous operation, assist in coordinating civilian operations and have the responsibility for 
generating the capacity to plan and run an autonomous operation, once a decision on such 
operation has been taken” (Simon, 2010, p.21). Within the Civ/Mil Cell, an EU Operations 
Center was created to act as an EU OHQ. The Operations Center was not a standing OHQ, 
and it could only be activated when Member States decided not to use NATO assets and 
national OHQs were unavailable (Grevi, 2009). The Operations Center, operational since 
2007, has yet to be used, but it does represent a European option available to the ESDP.
The Operations Center has not been used, but the Civ/Mil Cell has been increasingly 
active since it was established in 2005. Its permanent staff provides continuity to the ad-hoc 
nature of OHQ options available under ESDP. Furthermore, it presents added value by link-
ing the civil and military dimensions of crisis management – an ability not offered by any 
other institution (Guille, 2006). The Civ/Mil Cell often finds itself playing an active role in 
planning even though it is supposed to play merely a support role to the OHQs. As men-
tioned above, the national governments are often hesitant to activate their OHQs. During 
EUFOR RD Congo, the German OHQ at Potsdam placed more of its emphasis on Af-
ghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo. As a result, the Civ/Mil Cell and EUMS staff micromanaged 
much of the operation (Simon, 2010). The case of EUFOR DRC shows the greater role of 
ESDP institutions in planning missions, but this has often been a cause of mission delays. The 
Civ/Mil Cell is not designed to be an OHQ, yet at times it must act as a defacto OHQ due 
to the unpreparedness of the framework nation responsible for the mission.
CONCLUSION: A NEW EUROPE?
The EU’s foreign policy apparatus rapidly evolved after the end of the Cold War pro-
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viding the Union with significant new tools to address world events. Skeptics refused to 
accept that the embryonic institutions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
the European Security and Defense Policy were anything more than paper exercises. Writ-
ing in 2004 Robert Kagan observed that the “the effort to build a European force has so far 
been an embarrassment to the Europeans” (Kagan, 2004, p.53). This project was destined to 
fail because the central mission of the EU was to oppose power. Some staunch supporters of 
the EU agreed with Kagan’s assessment. The European project grew out of the desire to end 
war forever on the European continent through economic integration and civilian power. 
Acquiring military means would seem to go against everything on which the EU was built. 
Europe’s new leaders of the post-Cold War era were aware that the world had changed. 
Frustrated with the lack of meaningful influence beyond the European borders, they rec-
ognized that the EU had to develop some hard power capabilities if it wanted to uphold 
its values. ESDP represents the most significant attempt in a long history of failed efforts to 
add a military dimension to the European project. Today, Europe is far more integrated on 
security and defense issues than it was twenty years ago, but it still faces many challenges. In 
this paper, I examined two questions: first, why has European security and defense integra-
tion progressed since the 1990s; second, what are the barriers to further integration that have 
caused ESDP to take its current limited form?
Assessing the Indicators
I developed a three part model to explain European security and defense integration. 
The transatlantic relationship governed by NATO sets a framework for possible integration 
efforts. This framework directly influences how the EU Member States assess their strategic 
priorities. The UK is the strongest NATO supporter, so its actions at the EU level ensure that 
NATO remains the primary security institution. Despite France’s historically difficult rela-
tionship with NATO, it still wants the United States to carry the burden of European secu-
rity and defense. The next two levels of the model are part of a process called Brusselization. 
Through negotiations the Member States agree to cede authority to existing institutions or 
they establish new institutions under the EU framework. Overtime these institutions are able 
to assert a degree of autonomy from the Member State governments. The EU institutions 
then push back on the Member States influencing policy-making in the national capitals. 
This last process is crucial to integration. The creation of a central entity that lowers transac-
tion costs and encourages nation states to collaborate is merely international cooperation, 
but if the central entity is able to influence and force the actions of the national governments 
toward a certain outcome then there is integration.
The level of integration across the four indicators – procurement, intelligence, interop-
erability, and operational planning – has been uneven. The United States via NATO has 
clearly played a key role. NATO has an indirect negative effect on integration that is visible 
for procurement and intelligence, relatively non-existent for interoperability, and moderately 
visible for operational planning. The transatlantic security framework has limited the options 
available to European security and defense integration.
The European national governments have played an active role in promoting and hin-
dering European security and defense integration. France has been the most active pro-
ponent of an autonomous European capability; the UK has been the most resistant; and 
Germany has been somewhere in the middle. ESDP developed from compromises between 
the UK and France at St. Malo (later endorsed by Germany). On procurement and intel-
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ligence the national governments have often placed barriers to further integration, while 
on interoperability and operational planning they have acted outside the EU framework. 
The national governments, while largely reluctant to cede authority, have played and will 
continue to play an active role in directing the shaping and extent of European security and 
defense integration.
EU institutions are playing a greater role in shaping European security and defense in-
tegration, but they remain rather limited. On intelligence cooperation and operational plan-
ning ESDP institutions exhibit some autonomy from the national governments. European 
institutions struggled to make an impact on defense procurement, but the Commission’s 
new directive may allow the EU to exert influence on procurement issues. The EU institu-
tions are present on defense issues, and they have shown greater influence on the national 
governments as ESDP has matured. Just as NATO adds a dimension to the policy making 
of European national governments, the EU institutions contribute a new dimension that the 
national governments must address on defense and security issues.
Across the four indicators there has been progress toward greater security and defense 
integration. Twenty years ago there was only limited cooperation on procurement, no Eu-
ropean intelligence capabilities, few bilateral training and pooling efforts, and no opera-
tional planning capability available to an autonomous European operation. ESDP has been 
only partially responsible for this progress. Often cooperation efforts started outside the EU 
framework. Cooperation on procurement has progressed due to the role of defense firms 
decoupled from their “home” governments and the Commission. ESDP has encouraged 
intelligence cooperation but some of the intelligence institutions were created in the waning 
years of the WEU before being transferred to the EU. The bilateral pooling arrangements 
were established prior to the St. Malo summit. ESDP staff does play a role in operational 
planning but all EU military operations have been formally conducted by NATO or national 
OHQs. European security and defense integration most likely would have progressed in the 
last two decades without ESDP; however, ESDP has provided the framework necessary for 
the EU to discuss military matters.
European Defense Post-Lisbon
The Lisbon Treaty made substantial changes to the EU and CFSP but it had surpris-
ingly little effect on defense policy. Most of the changes were cosmetic, such as changing the 
name from ESDP to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The creation of 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (occupied by 
Catherine Ashton) will certainly elevate the role of the SITCEN and other institutions for-
merly attached to the SG/HR. The treaty also formally incorporated ESDP into the Treaty 
on the European Union declaring that “the common security and defense policy shall be an 
integral part of the common foreign and security policy” (Council of the European Union, 
2010). Besides officially codifying the institutions of ESDP, the Lisbon Treaty established two 
additional provisions. First, the treaty included a solidarity clause: “if a Member State is the 
victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an 
obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power” (Council, 2010). The clause 
is a very watered-down version of NATO’s Article 5 solidarity clause as it does not require 
Member States to intervene on behalf of another Member State. It is more of symbolic ges-
ture than a new obligation for Member States.
Second, the treaty allows for a process called permanent structured cooperation. Per-
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manent structured cooperation is not new to the EU as it has been used for the Eurozone 
and the Schengen Area for border control, but the Lisbon Treaty represents the first time that 
it has been formally applied to European defense. It allows for a select group of Member 
States with higher military capacities and desire to conduct more demanding missions under 
the auspices of the EU without the full twenty-seven Member States (Council, 2010). Only 
a qualified majority vote in Council is required to launch permanent structured cooperation 
(Council, 2010). A potential concern is that permanent structured cooperation could lead to 
multiple tracks of integration creating divisions between the Member States and preventing 
a common position (Margaras, 2010). Nonetheless, it gives the EU much more flexibility to 
conduct security and defense policy, and may prove to be an active tool for Member States 
in the near future. While not a permanent structured cooperation project, the Franco-British 
Treaty on Security and Defense Cooperation may act as a model for future collaborative 
efforts. Even if bilateral and multilateral arrangements become more common, they will be 
embedded within an EU security and defense framework. The Lisbon Treaty has secured 
ESDP as the EU’s security and defense policy mechanism.
Final Thoughts: The Capacity versus the Will to Intervene
The debate over whether the EU is experiencing security and defense integration is 
no longer important. European security and defense integration is a fact. It is not perfect 
and remains rather limited, but security and defense integration has progressed significantly 
since the end of the Cold War. Instead the debate should focus on the purpose of integra-
tion. First, does the EU have the capacity to intervene? As of 2011, the EU still lacks many 
important resources necessary for a more active military policy. The EU certainly cannot 
rival the United States, nor can it invade and occupy a foreign country. That was not the 
intention of ESDP. The EU’s security and defense policy is oriented toward crisis manage-
ment. The fact that the EU has engaged in eight military missions affirms that the EU does 
have the capacity to use military force for limited humanitarian purposes. The EU may 
always be relegated to “cleaning the dishes,” but it does it on its own volition (Moravcsik & 
Nicolaidis, 2005). Furthermore, the EU’s civilian apparatus bridges the civilian and military 
dimensions making it better suited for such tasks than the United States military’s emphasis 
on force projection.
The EU has the capacity to use military force, but it remains uncertain whether the 
Member States have the will to actively use the EU’s military capabilities. Darfur was seen 
as a perfect case for the EU to intervene since the atrocities went against the fundamental 
values of the EU. Instead, the EU Member States decided to assist the UN and the African 
Union. ESDP was designed to prevent a future Bosnia or Kosovo on the EU’s borders. In the 
early part of 2011, the political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa put the EU again 
in a difficult position. The EU will only launch a military operation with the legal backing 
of a UN Security Council Mandate or as a follow-on mission to a NATO operation, but 
the emergence of China and an assertive Russia in the last ten years have made the Security 
Council unwieldy for Europeans and Americans alike. ESDP is supposed to give the EU 
an autonomous security and defense policy, but the Europeans refuse to use it unilaterally. 
Furthermore, the EU institutions are bureaucratic and organized around consensus, which 
makes quick action difficult. This has caused some Member States, such as France and the 
UK, to work through bilateral channels to address crises. European security and defense 
integration has progressed enough to provide institutions with the capacity to intervene 
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and contribute to European security; the Europeans just need the will to fully resource and 
utilize them.
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